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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
TAXATION - TRUSTS - DOUBLE TAXATION - CERTIFICATES OF BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP.-An Ohio statute classified as incorporeal, equitable interests
in land evidenced by transferable certificates and placed a 5 per centum
tax on the income from them.' The appellant challenged this classification
as incorrect. His contention was denied by the Ohio Supreme Court which
upheld the taxing authorities in their view that such certificates were in-
corporeal interests which were a property in themselves which could be taxed
at the domicile of the owner regardless of the character of the corpus of the
trust or its location.2
On appeal from the state decision the United States Supreme Court in
Senior v. Braden3 held that for taxation purposes, at least, the cestui que
trust has a property interest in the trust res and that if the res consists
of land,4 a trust certificate covering a proportionate share of the land may
not be taxed under the Ohio statue,5 as an intangible.
The growing antipathy of the Supreme Court toward double taxation6
has made necessary a choice from among the various theories advanced as
to just what interest the cestui que trust has in the property held by the
trustee. One school of thought, exemplified by Austin W. Scott,7 holds that
today it is correct to say that the cestui que trust has two classes of rights;
a number of rights, positive and negative, against the trustee alone, and in
addition as equitable owner of the trust res, a right in rem against the
67 L. Ed. 731, 43 S. Ct. 445; Ex parte Williams (1928) 277 U. S. 267, 72
L. Ed. 877, 48 S. Ct. 523.1 Ohio General Code (1931) section 5328 provided that all investments
and other intangible property of persons residing in the state should be
subject to taxation. Section 5323 so defined "investment" as to include in-
corporeal rights of a pecuniary nature from which income is or may be
derived, including equitable interests in land and rents and royalties divided
into shares evidenced by transferable certificates. Section 2638 imposed
upon productive investments a tax of 5 per centum of their income yield.
This statute upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court in Rowe v. Braden (1933)
128 Ohio St. 597, 186 N. E. 392.
2 Senior v. Braden (1934) 128 Ohio St. 597, 193 N. E. 614.
3 (1935) 295 U. S. 422.
4 Real property has always been subject to tax only by the taxing juris-
diction in which it is actually located. Cooley on Taxation (4th ed. 1924),
section 1066.
5 Supra, note 1.
6 Baldwin v. Missouri (1930) 281 U. S. 586; Beidler v. South Carolina
Tax Commission (1930) 282 U. S. 1; First National Bank v. Maine (1932)
284 U. S. 312; Blodgett v. Silberman (1928) 277 U. S. 1; Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Virginia (1929) 280 U. S. 83.
17 Columbia Law Review 269; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudance (4th ed.
1928), section 972; Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts 430; Bates v.
Decree of Judge of Probate (1932) 131 Maine 176, 160 Atl. 22; Narragansett
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Burnham (1931) 51 R. I. 371, 154 Atl. 909.
R. C. Brown expresses the view that although the interest of the beneficiary
of a trust has a certain similarity to a chose in action, yet such interest is a
property right rather than a mere contract right and under the maxim
that equity follows the law, will be treated as a real or personal property
according to the nature of the trust res, 23 Ky. Law Journal 403.
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world at large to insist that it respect his ownership and to insist that it
refrain from using the property for any purpose inconsistent with the trust.
The other classical view, set out by Harlan F. Stone in 17 Columbia Law
Review 467, and adhered to in his dissent to Senior v. Braden,8 is that the
right of the cestui is a right in personam against the trustee, specifically
enforcible with reference to the trust res and that the cestui acquires such
rights in personam against third persons not because he is the equitable
owner of the trust res, but through equity imposing on third persons the
duty of not aiding in a breach of the trust or preventing the cestui from
having the benefit of the trustee's obligation. A third, unorthodox, view
is presented by Pierre Lepaule. His theory9 is that a trust is a social insti-
tution; an appropriation of assets with someone in charge, which the whole
world must respect. All questions of whether the cestui que trust has rights
in personam against only the - trustee or in rem as equitable owner of the
trust res are put aside as irrelevant.10
Faced with a trust which seems to fall in Pomeroy's fourth class of
trusts," one of which the primary object is to hold the corpus of the prop-
erty, receive its rents, profits and income and apply them to some prescribed
use, the Supreme Court followed the choice it had previously made in
Brown v. Fletcher 2 and held that the beneficiary had an "interest in and
to the property that was more than a bare right and much more than a
chose in action." This, in spite of the fact that under the terms of the
land trust certificates the holder had no other rights than a proportionate
share of the income and a like share of the proceeds from the final sale
of the property without any right to possession or to defend possession,
to partition or to management. The holders are restricted to an equitable
action for an accounting, to compel the performance of the trust and to
restrain breaches of it.' 3
Since the holder of the trust certificate' 4 had a property interest in the
land itself, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Ohio statute which
8 Supra, note 3.
9 (1917) 17 Columbia Law Review 467; Archer-Shee v. Garland, House
of Lords, Appeal Cases 1931. The House of Lords was persuaded that ac-
cording to American law, the appellant's wife had no property interest in
the income arising from the securities, stocks and shares constituting the
trust for her benefit in New York, but had only a chose in action against
the trustees, hence she had no property taxable by the British government.
10 (1928) 14 Cornell Law Quarterly 52.
1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1928) section 992.
12 (1915) 235 U. S. 589.
13 Supra, note 3.
'4 (1928) 2 U. of Cincinnati Law Review 255. Goldman and Clyde ex-
plain that an Ohio land trust certificate merely represents a split up for
the convenience of the ordinary investor of the ancient form of investment
known as ground rent. The interests of the beneficial owners are equitable
interests in the real estate. The land is taxed to the trustee or lessee and
the certificate holder is not subject to any real or personal tax and is
subject only to the Federal income tax.
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sought to tax the income from such certificates, regardless of the location
or character 15 of the trust property.
E. C. '37.
15 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905) 199 U. S. 194
holds that tangible personality permanently located beyond the owner's
domicile may not be taxed at the latter place under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Buck v. Beach (1907) 206 U. S. 392; Frick v. Pennsylvania (1925)
268 U. S. 473; Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Daughton (1926) 272 U. S.
567. And intangible personal property may acquire a taxable situs where
permanently located and employed and protected. New Orleans v. Stemple
(1898) 175 U. S. 309; Bristol v. Washington County (1900) 177 U. S. 133;
State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National d'Escompte (1903) 191
U. S. 388.
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